"MUTUAL RECOGNITION" AND CROSSBORDER FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
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I
INTRODUCTION

One of the pillars of the European Commission's ("Commission") single
market program is the removal of Member State' barriers to the provision of
2
financial services throughout the European Community ("Community").
The Commission's goal is to make a broad spectrum of banking, securities,
and insurance services available Community-wide. The integration of the
Community's financial services markets, particularly when coupled with the
removal of restrictions on the flow of capital within the Community,3 can be
expected to spur competition among financial intermediaries, increase
efficiency in the financial services industry, provide bank and insurance
customers and securities investors with greater choice, and reduce the cost of
capital for borrowers and issuers. 4 The development of Community-scale
capital markets may also provide a catalyst for change in the climate for
European Community takeover bids, particularly in countries where
underdeveloped equity markets have impeded the growth of takeover
activity. 5 The Commission does not intend, however, for the achievement of a
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1. The 12 member states in the European Community are Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and The United
Kingdom. In addition, Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Malta, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey have
applied for European Community membership.
2. See Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European
Council, COM(85)310 final (June 14, 1985) ("The White Paper").
3. See John A. Usher, 1992 and the Implicationsfor Banking and Finance: An Overview, in Ross
Cranston, ed, The Single Market and the Law of Banking 11-14 (Lloyds' of London Press, 1991) ("Single
Market").
4. See Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Commission of the European
Communities, The Economics of 1992: An Assessment of the Potential Economic Effects of Completing the
Internal Market of the European Community, No 35, 86-94 (March 1988).
5. See generally Study by Coopers & Lybrand, Barriers to Takeovers in the European Community
(Her Maj Stationery Office, 1989).
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single market for Community financial services to result in a lowering of
6
necessary prudential standards or supervisory oversight.
In general, the Commission has pursued its goals in the financial services
sector by means of "mutual recognition" regimes for the authorization and
supervision of financial services providers. This approach is premised on a
harmonization of basic standards and operates mainly on the principle of
"home country control." 7 Thus, in general, a financial institution from one
Member State of the Community would be permitted to provide services or
establish branches in any other Member State of the Community, subject to
primary prudential regulation by its "home" Member State. A limited degree
of ancillary regulation would be provided by the "host" Member States, in
which the institution offers its services.8
The adoption of a mutual recognition approach represented a significant
change in the Commission's methodology for regulatory convergence in the
Community. In 1985, the Commission published a seminal White Paper 9 that
rejected the strict harmonization method previously employed in the effort to
build the common market called for by the Treaty of Rome.' 0 Under that
method, the Commission had sought to achieve Member State agreement on
comprehensive and detailed Community-wide standards. That effort proved
too difficult and time-consuming given the many disparate traditions and
interests of the various Member States and the unanimity required by Article
100 of the Treaty of Rome." Under the mutual recognition approach
embraced by the White Paper, however, only essential standards would be
harmonized.' 2 As a result, Member States with overly restrictive regulation
6. See generally George S. Zavvos, The Integration of Banking Markets in the EEC-The Second
Banking Coordination Directive, 2 J Intl Banking L 53 (1988).
7. See The White Paper at 28
103 (cited in note 2).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, [1958] 298 UNTS 11
("Treaty of Rome").
11. Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome empowers the Council of the European Communities,
"acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, [to] issue directives for the approximation
of such provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States as directly
affect the establishment or functioning of the common market." Obtaining unanimous approval of
detailed and technical regulations (as opposed to basic standards) affecting areas where national
concerns differ (such as consumer protection or the health, safety, and welfare of citizens) greatly
delayed the decisionmaking process. See The White Paper at 19-20 (cited in note 2).
The unanimity requirement was later modified by the Single European Act, OJ(L#L 169,) which
authorizes the Council, after consulting with the Economic and Social Committee of the European
Community, to act by a qualified majority (utilizing weighted voting) on proposals from the
Commission, except with respect to proposals relating to fiscal (largely tax) matters, the free
movement of persons, or the rights and interests of labor. See Treaty of Rome at art 100a.
12. The White Paper at 19-20, 22-23 (cited in note 2). The Commission's promulgation of the
mutual recognition approach was facilitated by prior rulings of the European Court ofJustice striking
down Member State restrictions on the importation of goods lawfully produced in another Member
State. See, for example, Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v BundesmonopolverwaltungfurBranntwein, [ 1979]
3 CMLR 494, 663 (1979) ("There is .. .no valid reason why, provided that they have been lawfully
produced and marketed in one of the Member States, [goods] should not be introduced into any
other Member State" except where restrictions and regulations "serve a purpose which is in the
general interest and such as to take precedence over the requirements of the free movement of
goods, which constitutes one of the fundamental rules of the Community.").
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would be pressured to deregulate-but not below the essential standards-in
order not to disadvantage their domestic institutions, which would be faced
with less-regulated competitors from other Member States. Thus, the mutual
recognition approach encourages convergence of standards through
13
competition among diverse systems of regulation.
This article discusses the application of the mutual recognition approach
to the provision of cross-border banking and investment services in the
European Community. 14 It begins with a brief discussion of the basis in the
Treaty of Rome for the Commission's single market program for financial
services. The article then addresses the regulation of financial intermediaries
under the mutual recognition regimes of the Second Banking Directive,'15 the
proposed Investment Services Directive,1 6 the UCITS Directive, 1 7 the Listing
Particulars Directive, 18 and the Prospectus Directive.19 The article concludes
with a discussion of several outstanding issues with respect to the
20
Community's system of financial services regulation.
13. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Internationalization of the World's Securities Markets: Economic Causes
and Regulatory Consequences, 4J Fin Serv Res 349, 371-73 (1990).
14. A discussion of the Community's progress toward a mutual recognition regime in the
various areas of insurance regulation is beyond the scope of this article.
15. Council Directive 89/646, 1989 OJ (L 386) (amending Directive 77/780) ("Second Banking
Directive").
16. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive, 90/C 42/06, 1990 OJ (C 42) ("Investment
Services Directive").
17. Council Directive 85/611, 1985 OJ (L 375/3) (on Undertakings for Collective Investment in
Transferable Securities) ("UCITS Directive"), as amended by Council Directive 88/220, 1988 OJ (L
100/31) ("March 22 Directive").
18. Council Directive 80/390, 1980 OJ (L 100/1) ("Listing Particulars Directive") as amended
by Council Directive 87/345, 1987 OJ (L 185/81) ("June 22 Directive"), Council Directive 90/211,
1990 OJ (L 112/24) ("April 23 Directive"), and Council Directive 82/148, 1982 OJ (L 62/22).
19. Council Directive 89/298, 1989 OJ (L 124/8) ("Prospectus Directive").
20. Major recent developments would both broaden and deepen the Community and would
change the context in which the mutual recognition approach operates. The Treaty on European
Union, or the "Maastricht Treaty," was entered into by the heads of the Community's Member States
on February 7, 1992. Treaty on European Union, 31 Intl Legal Mat 247 (1992). The Maastricht
Treaty proposes a number of amendments to the three founding treaties of the Community with the
purpose of fostering a closer political, economic, and monetary union.
While the Maastricht Treaty does not address directly the specific subject matter of the directives
discussed in this article, it re-affirms the Member States' commitment to the "free movement of
goods, persons, services and capital" within the Community, as it was first set out in the Treaty of
Rome. Id art G(3) at 257.
In addition, in order to address concerns about Member State sovereignty, which often are
reflected in resistance to the mutual recognition approach in areas in which fiscal and monetary
policy could be affected, Article B of the Maastricht Treaty provides that "[t he objectives of the
Union shall be achieved . . . while respecting the principle of subsidiarity." Id at 255. Article G(5)
amends the Treaty of Rome to define subsidiarity thus:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action,
in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
Id at 258.
So far, the Maastricht Treaty has been ratified by national referenda in Ireland and France, and by
parliamentaiy vote in Greece and Luxembourg, but failed to win approval in the Danish referendum.
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II
TREATY PROVISIONS RELATING TO FINANCIAL SERVICES

The mutual recognition/home country control approach to financial
services in the Community is intended by the Commission to implement two
of the basic freedoms guaranteed within the Community by the Treaty of
Rome: the "freedom of establishment" 2 1 (as part of the "free movement of
persons" 2 2) and the "freedom to provide services." 2 3 These freedoms,
together with the "free movement of goods," 24 and the "free movement of
capital," 2 5 are fundamental freedoms protected by the Treaty.
The freedom of establishment encompasses the right of a Member State
national to set up a business in another Member State as though a national of
that other Member State. 26 Article 52 of the Treaty of Rome states, in part:
[R]estrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the
territory of another Member State shall be abolished by progressive stages .... Such
progressive abolition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting up of agencies,
branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory
of any Member State.

Freedom of establishment, then, includes the right to set up and manage
companies under the same conditions applicable to nationals of the Member
State where the establishment is sought.
Controversy over the Maastricht Treaty and related turmoil in the Community currency markets have
raised doubts regarding whether it will ultimately go into effect in its current form.
On May 6, 1992, the Community entered into an agreement with the European Free Trade
Association ("EFTA") on the creation of the European Economic Area ("EEA"). The new
agreement is expected to come into effect on January 1, 1993, after ratification by the European
Parliament and the national legislatures of the Community and EFTA Member States, and by a
national referendum in the case of Switzerland. The EEA is widely expected to be a transitional
arrangement before the EFTA countries become full Member States of the Community. Of the
seven EFTA countries, Austria, Sweden, Finland, and Switzerland have applied for membership in
the Community; Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein have not.
The new agreement aims to "establish a dynamic and homogenous EEA, based on common rules
and equal conditions of competition." See Opinion of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities Regarding the Draft Agreement Between the European Community and the European
Free Trade Association Relating to the Creation of the European Economic Area, Dec 14, 1991, 3
Intl Legal Mat 442, 445 (1992) (quoting the preamble to the draft EEA agreement). The body of
common rules to be applied in the EEA will be "substantially identical to that which is in force within
the EEC." Id at 451. Subject to certain exceptions and transitional provisions for the individual
EFTA countries contained in Annex IX to the EEA agreement, the directives discussed in this article
will apply to the EFTA countries after the EEA comes into effect. It should be noted, however, the
directives not yet adopted by the Community, such as the proposed Investment Services and Capital
Adequacy Directives, will not automatically become part of EEA law. They are expected, however, to
be adopted by the EFTA countries.
21. Treaty of Rome at arts 52-58 (cited in note 10).
22. Id at arts 48-58.
23. Id at arts 59-66. The Community's goal is "the creation of a unified banking market based
on mutual recognition of financial standards and a single banking licence valid throughout the EC."
George S. Zavvos, 1992: One Market, Intl Fin L Rev 7 (March 1988). Under this unified banking
market, a Community bank would be permitted to establish branches and to provide financial
services throughout the Community without establishment outside its home Member State. Id.
24. Treaty of Rome at arts 9-37 (cited in note 10).
25. Id at arts 67-73.
26. Id at art 52.
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The freedom to provide services is the right of a Community national (for
example, a firm established in a Member State) to provide services across
Member State boundaries without the need to establish outside the home
Member State.2 7 This right is addressed in article 59 of the Treaty of Rome:
Restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community shall be
progressively abolished . . . in respect of nationals of Member States who are
established in a state of the Community other than that of the person for whom the
services are intended.

The freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services are
directly infringed by provisions of a Member State's law that discriminate
against businesses from other Member States. 2 8 Even in the absence of
discrimination, however, a Member State's nondiscriminatory standards can
be costly and can duplicate or conflict with standards of other Member States,
thereby indirectly favoring domestic businesses. Although both the freedom
of establishment and the freedom to provide services are expressly protected
by the Treaty of Rome, the practical implementation of these freedoms is
generally best achieved through the process of Community legislation rather
than through the arduous and uncertain process of case law development. 29
The Commission's approach to the realization of the freedom of
establishment and the freedom to provide services in the financial services
area has been primarily through Community financial services initiatives that
provide a framework in which Community banks and securities firms may set
30
up branches or subsidiaries and transact their business in any Member State.
A.

The Second Banking Directive

The general rule of the Second Banking Directive is that each Member
State must recognize the license granted to a Community credit institution by
any other Member State, and that all core activities 3' engaged in by a credit
27. For an excellent discussion of the right of establishment and the freedom to provide
services, see Derrick Wyatt & Alan Dashwood, The Substantive Law of the EEC 198-223 (Sweet &
Maxwell, 2d ed 1987).
28. See Case C- 175/88 BiehI v Administration des Contributionsdu Grand-Duchede Luxembourg, [1990]
3 CMLR 143 (Member State income tax provisions that directly or indirectly discriminate against
workers from other Member States based on nationality violate article 48(2) of the Treaty of Rome
guaranteeing freedom of movement for workers).
29. A legislative approach to fulfilling the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide
services is preferable to reliance upon case law development for several reasons. First, because
directives are reviewed by three political bodies (drafted by the Commission, considered by the
European Parliament, and adopted by the Council of Ministers), they are subject to a broader range
of social, economic, and political considerations than are generally considered in case-specific
decisionmaking. Second, because the outcome of litigation is, to a great extent, dependent upon a
litigant's ability as an advocate and because such decisions are binding only upon those to whom they
are addressed, a legislative approach is a more reliable means of both realizing the freedoms
guaranteed by the Treaty of Rome and ensuring some uniformity among the Member States in so
doing. Litigation, however, has been an important factor in expanding the boundaries of legislation.
See note 12.
30. See generally Zavvos, Intl Fin L Rev at 7 (cited in note 23).
31. Among these activities are deposit-taking and other forms of borrowing, consumer credit,
mortgage lending, trade finance, securities underwriting, securities trading, and portfolio
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institution3 2 in the Community are to be regulated by its home Member
State.3 3 The result is a type of extraterritorial regulation by the home
Member State, whose domestic regulation continues to govern the business
34
activities of its domestic enterprises conducted in any other Member State.
For example, because the permitted banking activities include securities
operations, a bank that is allowed to deal in securities in its home Member
State would be allowed to deal in securities in any Member State, even if
securities activities are prohibited for domestic credit institutions in the latter
Member State. Similarly, an Italian branch of an English bank would be
permitted to engage in mortgage lending in Italy, whether or not an Italian
bank were permitted to do so, so long as banks in the United Kingdom were
authorized to engage in mortgage lending.
The provisions of the Second Banking Directive establishing mutual
recognition and home country control apply to the direct rendering of
services across borders, as well as to services offered through a local branch of
a credit institution established and regulated elsewhere in the Community. A
subsidiary of a Community credit institution that is not itself a credit
institution established in the Community would generally not be entitled to
35
the benefits of the Directive.
The Commission has established minimum harmonized supervisory
standards for credit institutions in the Community through a number of
legislative measures. The Second Banking Directive itself contains several
such provisions: (1) a minimum capital ("own funds") level of five milllion
European Currency Units ("ECU") (except for certain credit institutions with
management. The full set of activities subject to mutual recognition is listed in an annex to the
Second Banking Directive. See appendix.
32. The term "credit institution" is defined by reference to Council Directive 77/780, 1977 0J
(L 322/30) (the "First Banking Directive"), which provides that a "credit institution" is any
enterprise the business of which is to "receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and
to grant credits for its own account." The First Banking Directive exempts from its provisions a
specific list of credit institutions, primarily those affected with a public interest or cooperative savings
enterprises, and article 2(2) of the Second Banking Directive (cited in note 15) exempts the same
institutions by reference to the list contained in the First Banking Directive. Among the exempted
entities are central banks of Member States, post office giro institutions, credit unions and municipal
banks. Importantly, branches of a non-Community credit institution are not generally treated as
Community entities and thus may not benefit from the Second Banking Directive's liberalizations.
33. Under article 1(7) of the Second Banking Directive, the home Member State is the Member
State in which a credit institution has its regulatory authorization. Second Banking Directive (cited in
note 15).
34. As noted earlier, under this approach Member States with overly restrictive regulation put
their domestic businesses at a distinct competitive disadvantage by subjecting them to more stringent
requirements than those that apply to their counterparts established in host Member States in which
the domestic businesses are operating. If the cost of regulation proves too high, domestic businesses
of overregulated Member States may seek to re-establish themselves in less-regulated markets of
other Member States. See Grundfest, 4J Fin Serv Res at 372 (cited in note 13).
35. Article 18 of the Second Banking Directive provides, however, that a subsidiary of a credit
institution that would fall outside the definition of "credit institution," for example, a securities
subsidiary, may nonetheless be entitled to the benefits (or subject to the burdens) of home Member
State supervision across Member State borders, provided that its activities are supervised on a
consolidated basis with those of its parent credit institution, and that the parent credit institution
holds 90% or more of the voting share capital of the subsidiary and guarantees the commitments
entered into by the subsidiary. Second Banking Directive at art 18 (cited in note 15).
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a restricted scope of business);3 6 (2) a suitability requirement for directors,
managers, and major shareholders of a credit institution;3 7 (3) limits on the
ability of a credit institution to hold shares in a nonfinancial institution;38 and
(4) a requirement that each Member State "ensure the existence within each
credit institution of sound administrative and accounting procedures and
adequate internal control mechanisms," although no particular procedures or
controls are specified or required in the Directive. 39 In addition to the
harmonization provisions contained within the Second Banking Directive
itself, article 22 of the Directive provides for implementation concurrent with
the Commission's directives on the measurement of credit institution capital
and minimum solvency ratios. 40 Through these measures, the Commission
has effected a standardization of Member State banking laws via the
harmonization of minimum supervisory standards for Community credit
institutions. This standardization provides the basic framework within which
the mutual recognition regime can operate and prevents the possibility of a
"race to the bottom" that could result from unrestricted regulatory
4
competition. 1
Pending further coordination of minimum standards within the
Community, each host Member State shall retain (1) responsibility (in
cooperation with the home Member State) for the supervision of the liquidity
of credit institutions operating in the host Member State, as well as
responsibility for implementation of host Member State monetary policy, in
each case so long as the measures imposed do not embody discriminatory or
restrictive treatment based on the location of the credit institution in another
36. Id at art 3.
37. Id at art 5.
38. The Second Banking Directive requires that any permitted non-banking activities of banks
be supported ECU-for-ECU by capital. Subject to an increase in the amount of its own funds or
other remedial measures, a credit institution may not maintain a "qualifying holding" in an amount
greater than 15% of its own funds in any institution that is not (1) a credit institution, (2) a financial
institution (defined as a company, other than a credit institution, which has as its principal activity
any of the core activities permitted to a credit institution under the Directive except the taking of
deposits and other repayable funds from the public), or (3) a company pursuing an activity that is a
direct extension of banking or concerning services ancillary to banking, such as leasing, factoring, the
management of unit trusts, data processing services, or any other similar activity. A "qualifying
holding" is a direct or indirect holding that represents 10% or more of the capital or voting rights of
a company, or that makes possible the exertion of a significant influence over management. The
total of all qualifying holdings in non-financial institutions must not exceed 60% of a credit
institution's own funds. Id at art 12.
These limits need not be observed if the amounts in excess of the limits are covered completely
by the institution's own funds and those institution's own funds are not included in the calculation of
the solvency ratio of the institution. Existing credit institutions with holdings exceeding the limits
will be allowed a period of ten years to decrease those holdings or to cover those holdings by
increasing their capital.
39. Second Banking Directive at 11 (cited in note 15).
40. See Council Directive 89/299, 1989 OJ (L 124/16) (as amended by Directive 92/16, 1992
OJ (L 75/48)) ("Own Funds Directive"), and Council Directive 89/647, 1989 OJ (L 386/14)
("Solvency Ratio Directive").
41. See Michael Gruson & Wolfgang Feuring, A European Community Banking Law: The Second
Banking and Related Directives, in Cranston, Single Market at 28 (cited in note 3).
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Member State, 42 and (2) the authority to take appropriate measures to
prevent or punish irregularities committed by credit institutions operating
within the host Member State's borders that violate rules adopted by the host
43
Member State "in the interest of the general good."1
Additionally, article 14(3) of the Second Banking Directive requires home
and host Member States' authorities to collaborate to ensure that credit
institutions operating in the host Member State make sufficient provision
against market risk with respect to operations in securities markets in the
territory of the host Member State. This assurance is especially necessary
because the Solvency Ratio Directive covers only credit risk-that is, risk
attaching to the particular type of counterparty in a banking transactionrather than the market or position risk involved in securities activities.
However, the expected adoption of the Investment Services Directive and the
Capital Adequacy Directive 44 should make collaborative efforts between
individual home and host Member States to provide against position risk
much less necessary.
B.

Proposed Investment Services Directive

The proposed Investment Services Directive would provide for the
prudential regulation of investment firms under a mutual recognition regime
based on home country control and harmonized essential minimum
prudential standards of behavior, similar to that established for credit
institutions by the Second Banking Directive. The similarity of the two
directives reflects the Commission's view that the Investment Services
Directive and the Second Banking Directive should be closely interrelated in
the interest of maintaining fair competition between banks and non-banks
that provide investment services. 4 5 The Investment Services Directive also
seeks to open up membership in Community securities exchanges, as well as
in Community financial futures and options exchanges, to investment firms
46
authorized to conduct these activities in their home Member State.
The Investment Services Directive would apply to those in the business of
providing investment services, which are defined by reference to the set of
activities listed in an annex to the Directive. 4 7 In general, these activities
would include the following: brokerage, dealing, market making, portfolio
management, underwriting and distribution of securities, individual
investment advice, and safekeeping and administration.
42. Second Banking Directive at art 14(2) (cited in note 15).
43. Id at art 21(5). For a more detailed discussion of the "general good" exception, see Part
IIC.
44. See notes 16 and 51.
45. Investment Services Directive at 7 (cited in note 16). Many of the provisions in the
Investment Services Directive are similar or identical to correlative provisions in the Second Banking
Directive.
46. Id.
47. Id at annex.
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The Directive would expressly permit these services with respect to some
or all of the following instruments: transferable securities, money market
investments, financial futures and options, and exchange rate and interest rate
instruments. 48 The Directive would also permit ancillary services. 4 9
To the extent that an investment firm is authorized by its home Member
State 50 to engage in the listed investment services, it would be able to perform
those services in other Member States as well, either across Member State
borders or through the establishment of one or more branches within the
boundaries of other Member States. Prudential supervision of the investment
firm would be the responsibility of its home Member State and would cover
such matters as the suitability of major shareholders and those who direct the
business of the investment firm, 5' monitoring capital requirements, 5 2 and the
48. The scope of activities and instruments covered by the Investment Services Directive was the
subject of much substantive negotiation and detailed drafting. For example, some commentators
expressed concern that authorization for "underwriting" may not include authorization for the lead
management of a syndicate of underwriters, which is a distinction drawn in Germany (ostensibly for
monetary control reasons). See Tony Shea, The Proposed Investment Services Directive, in Cranston, Single
M'arket at 130 n59 (cited in note 3). Similarly, the British Department of Trade and Industry (the
"DTI") took the view that sub-underwriting should not be included as a permissible investment firm
activity and that the term "distribution" is unclear. The DTI suggested that the term "placing"
would be preferable. See British Department of Trade and Industry, EC Investment Services Directive: A
Consultative Document at 6 26 (July 1990).
49. Investment Services Directive at art 3(1) (cited in note 16).
50. Under the Investment Services Directive, the home Member State of an investment firm is
the Member State in which it has its registered office (or, if it has none, its head office). Id at art
1(4)(b).
51. Id at arts 3(2), 4.
52. See id at arts 3(2), 9. The proposed Capital Adequacy Directive would establish minimum
capital requirements to cover risks associated with the "trading book" activities of investment firms
and credit institutions. See Common Position Adopted by the Council on 27/07/92 with a View to
Adopting a Directive on the Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit Institutions, Eur Parl
Doc (SYN 257)(1992). Trading book activities include (1) proprietary holdings in marketable
investment instruments such as transferable securities, units in collective investment funds, financial
futures and options, and (2) transactions such as repurchase agreements, securities borrowing, fees
and commissions related to trading book activities. The risks associated with trading book activities
for the purposes of the Capital Adequacy Directive include settlement risk, position risk, foreign
exchange risk, and "other risks" related to fee-based work.
The proposed Capital Adequacy Directive would set initial minimum capital requirements for
investment firms but not for firms which engage solely in the ancillary service of providing
investment advice (which, conversely, would not have the benefit of a Community-wide authorization
under the Investment Services Directive).
The form of capital which may be used to meet the proposed Capital Adequacy Directive
requirements would include short-term subordinated debt, up to 250% of share capital and reserves
as specified in article 2(1) of the Own Funds Directive (cited in note 40). This compares with (1) the
minimum maturity of five years for qualifying subordinated debt and (2) the lower permitted
maximum of 50% of core capital, which are requirements that the Own Funds Directive and the
Solvency Ratio Directive (cited in note 40) would impose on the non-trading book exposures of both
credit institutions and investment firms.
Under the proposed Capital Adequacy Directive, large exposures may exceed the general limit of
25% of capital for a period of 10 days, after which a sliding scale of additional capital requirements
would apply, which become more onerous the longer the exposure remains on the trading book.
The proposed Capital Adequacy Directive would also provide for consolidated supervision of
investment firms. However, unlike the Consolidated Supervision Directive (cited in note 118), which
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adequacy of accounting, record keeping, and internal control systems. 53 In
addition, the home Member State would be responsible for requiring that
investment firms have structural mechanisms in place to prevent conflicts of
interest. 5 4 Finally, the home Member State would be responsible for two
areas of investor protection: segregation of clients' funds and securities, and
compensation arrangements with respect to investors' claims unpaid due to
55
the default or bankruptcy of investment firms.
The proposed Directive does not attempt to harmonize conduct of
business or advertising rules. As a consequence, host Member States may
regulate those areas "in the interest of the general good." 56
In addition to ensuring that investment firms may pursue the activities
covered by the Directive and any ancillary activities, host Member States must
ensure that investment firms authorized to provide brokerage, dealing, or
market-making services in their home Member States have access to
membership in stock exchanges and organized securities markets of host
Member States. 57 Host Member States must therefore ensure that investment
firms from other Member States have the option to become members of
national stock exchanges or organized securities markets either directly
through branches, or indirectly through subsidiaries or by the acquisition of
58
an existing member firm.

A Community credit institution authorized by its banking license to
engage in the securities business would not need a separate authorization
under the proposed Investment Services Directive in order to provide
investment banking services in other Member States. 5 9 As with investment
firms, a credit institution's home Member State would have the responsibility
for prudential regulation 6 ° and for requiring adequate provision against
market risk. 6 1 In addition, each Member State would be obliged to ensure
that credit institutions that are also engaged in investment banking have
access to that Member State's stock exchanges.
regulates credit institutions, the proposed Capital Adequacy Directive would allow Member State
authorities the discretion to exempt investment firms from consolidated supervision.
The proposed Capital Adequacy Directive may be further reviewed and modified upon
recommendations submitted within three years after the Directive's effective date by a committee of
representatives from the Member States.
53. Investment Services Directive at art 11 (1) (cited in note 16).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id at arts 16(5), (10). See discussion of the "general good" exception in Part IIC.
57. Investment Services Directive at art 13(1) (cited in note 16).
58. Id at art 13(2). Similarly, host Member States must ensure that investment firms authorized
to deal in financial futures and options in their home Member State have access to financial futures
and options exchanges in the host Member State. Id at art 13(4).
59. Id at art 2.
60. Id at art 11.
61. The provision of capital to guard against various market risks associated with the credit
institution's "trading book" activities with respect to myriad marketable investment instruments is
governed by the Capital Adequacy Directive (cited in note 52). These risks include position risk,
settlement risk, and foreign exchange risk. As to the non-trading book activities of the credit
institution, the applicable capital requirements are set out in the Solvency Ratio Directive (cited in
note 40) and the Own Funds Directive (cited in note 40). See note 52.

Page 7: Autumn 1992]

EC

FINANCIAL SERVICES

Negotiations over the Directive reached an important breakthrough when
the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers ("ECOFIN") of the
Community agreed in principle on several major points in June of 1992.62
Nevertheless, its simultaneous implementation with the Second Banking
Directive is still doubtful. Securities firms are particularly concerned about
these delays because of the competitive disadvantages they could suffer if the
Investment Services Directive is not implemented simultaneously with the
Second Banking Directive at the beginning of 1993. At that point, banks
(either directly or through subsidiaries) will enjoy the freedom of a single
market for securities activities in the Community, while securities firms that
do not have the benefit of the Second Banking Directive would still be
restricted by national regulation, with recourse only to the protections of the
63
Treaty of Rome.
C.

Regulation on Grounds of "General Good"

The Second Banking Directive and Investment Services Directive each
contain provisions allowing host Member States to impose rules justified by
the "general good." 64 This exception gives Member States some latitude to
continue to regulate banks and investment firms from other Member States
that operate within their jurisdictions. The Directives do not define "general
good," although any measures penalizing or restricting credit institutions or
investment firms under this exception must be "properly justified and
62. See, for example, Henry Steuart, ISD: In-Principle Agreement on Sticking Points, Financial
Regulation Report 6 (july 1992). Under the agreement reached by ECOFIN, regulated markets must
publish at the beginning of each business day the average weighted price for each traded instrument,
its highest and lowest prices, and the volume traded during the previous business day. In addition,
each continuous trade-matching and automated quotation market must publish various price and
trading volume information at hourly and shorter intervals. Member State authorities have the
discretion to suspend these publication requirements in exceptional circumstances, such as where
the trader's anonymity could be undermined by large transactions or transactions in illiquid markets.
Authorized firms will be required to maintain records of trading activities and make them available to
regulators no later than at the end of the following day.
Banks would be given direct access to national exchanges under the proposed Investment
Services Directive, Amended Proposal for a Council Directive, 90/C 42/06, 1990 OJ (L42), although
Member States which currently deny such access to banks may continue to do so through year-end
1996 (in the case of Belgium, France, and Italy) or year-end 1999 (in the case of Spain, Greece, and
Portugal). Fhe issue of direct bank access will be reviewed before these two dates.
Natural persons and partnerships may be authorized to do business under the proposed
Investment Services Directive if they can give satisfactory assurances that they will be able to provide
investors with protection comparable to that afforded by legal persons. Member States may also
require that certain instruments be traded on regulated markets, unless the investor chooses
otherwise.
63. See Simon London, Fresh Try on Securities Directive, Fin Times 27 (July 16, 1991); ISE Chairman
Blasts France Over ISD, 2 Intl Sec Reg Rep (June 17, 1991); SEAQ Seen As Starting Point, id.
64. Second Banking Directive at art 21(5) (cited in note 15); Investment Services Directive at art
16(5), (10) (cited in note 16). Based on general principles of Community law, "to the extent that
such pinciples may be extrapolated from the jurisprudence of the Court ofJustice," commentators
have argued that the term "general good" as used in these Directives refers to the general good of
the Community as a whole, not the general good of the host Member State seeking to support its
regulation on "general good" grounds. See, for example, Marc Dassesse, Retail Banking Services in
1992, in Cranston, Single Market at 66-67 (cited in note 3).
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The circumstances under which Member State regulation

will be justified by the "general good" is thus left for resolution by the
European Court of Justice.
Four related insurance cases decided by the European Court of Justice in
1986 provide some indication of the circumstances under which host country
restrictions imposed on the ground of protecting the general good may be
upheld. 66 France, Denmark, Germany, and Ireland had enacted laws
requiring Member State insurers already established and authorized in their
home state to apply for additional authorization in the Member State in which
they sold insurance. In some cases the insurers were also required to
maintain an establishment in the Member State in which they provided
insurance services. The Commission considered these restrictions unjustified
in light of the common authorization procedure established by article 6 of
Council Directive 73/239,67 which applies to all insurance undertakings in
Member States. In the Commission's opinion, Member States were obliged to
permit insurers authorized pursuant to this common procedure, though not
physically established on their territory, to provide services within their
68
territory.
Member States attempted to defend these insurance regulations on
"public interest" grounds, arguing that regulations in other Member States
were inadequate, particularly with respect to the financial position and
technical reserves of insurance companies as well as in the area of minimum
standards of fairness in insurance contracts. The European Court of Justice
found the restrictions to be impermissible infringements on the freedom to
provide services in the case of co-insurance, due in large part to the
sophisticated nature of the policyholders that customarily purchase such
insurance. 69 In the case of general direct insurance, however, the Court held
that host Member State authorization requirements, but not requirements of
establishment, could be justified for three reasons: (1) an imperative public
interest mandated that individual consumers be protected, both as
policyholders and as insured persons, from the risk that an insurance
company would either fail or impose oppressive contracts; (2) the public
interest in question was not already protected by the rules of the Member
65. Second Banking Directive at art 21(6) (cited in note 15); Investment Services Directive at art
16(6) (cited in note 16).
66. Case 220/83 Commission v France, [1987] 2 CMLR 113 (1986); Case 252/83 Commission v
Denmark, [19871 2 CMLR 169 (1986); Case 205/84 Commission v Germany, [1987] 2 CMLR 69 (1986);
Case 206/84 Commission v Ireland, [1987] 2 CMLR 150 (1986).
67. 1973 OJ (L #228) (regulations and administration of direct insurance other than life
assurance).
68. Commission v France, [ 1987] 2 CMLR at 120-21; Commission v Denmark, [ 1987] 2 CMLR at 172;
Commission v Germany, [1987] 2 CMLR at 82-83; Commission v Ireland, [19871 2 CMLR at 154.
69. The Court rejected the argument that these restrictions were justified by the need for
consumer protection, finding that co-insurance was likely to be taken out by large commercial,
industrial, or governmental organizations, which have access to advice from either a legal expert or
an independent, professional insurance broker and which are able to assess and negotiate insurance
policies offered to them. Commission v France, [1987] 2 CMLR at 134; Commission v Germany, [1987] 2
CMLR at 110.
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State of establishment; 70 and (3) the result achieved by authorization could
not be obtained by less restrictive rules, although the requirement of a
separate establishment was disproportionately restrictive and therefore
impermissible.

71

The particular facts that allowed the Court to find that host Member State
regulation of general direct insurance services was "justified" appear less
likely to exist with respect to the Second Banking Directive because the
Second Banking Directive will not become effective until related directives on
own funds and solvency ratios 7 2 (which set agreed-to minimum standards for
the protection of customers and third parties against failures of credit
institutions) have been implemented. Similarly, the Investment Services
Directive will be implemented alongside the Capital Adequacy Directive, with
its harmonized rules on capital requirements. If, however, the Court were to
find host Member State regulation justified, it would most likely do so in the
areas of retail rather than wholesale banking and investment services, as the
Court has demonstrated its unwillingness to restrict the provision of services
in order to protect presumably sophisticated institutional customers.
III
REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES THROUGH OTHER
MUTUAL RECOGNITION REGIMES

A.

73
The UCITS Directive

As with other financial intermediaries in the Community, the Commission
has attempted to create a single market for open-end collective investment
funds, known as "UCITS" in Community jargon, through a mutual
recognition/home country control approach. Host Member State concerns
regarding investor protection have been met primarily through the
establishment of minimum standards of liquidity, diversification, disclosure,
and asset management.
74
The UCITS Directive requires Member States to recognize any UCITS
authorized in another Member State, so long as it complies with certain
notification

and filing requirements.

The

primary

responsibility for

prudential regulation of a UCITS rests with its home Member State. 75 A
70. The Court found that existing Directives did not harmonize national rules regarding
technical reserves (such as requiring that financial resources, other than the undertaking's own
capital resources, be set aside to guarantee liabilities under insurance contracts) or require the
supervisory authority in the Member State of establishment to supervise compliance with the rules of
the Member State in which the service is provided. Commission v Germany, [1987] 2 CMLR at 104.
71. See id at 102-09.
72. Second Banking Directive at I (cited in note 15). See also the Own Funds Directive (cited in
note 40) and the Solvency Ratio Directive (cited in note 40).
73. See note 17 for complete citation.
74. UCITS may be structured as investment companies with a corporate form (for example, a
societe dinvestissement a capitalvariable or SICAV) or unincorporated trusts or funds (for example, a unit
trust or afonds commun de placement or FCP) with management companies.
75. Securities issued by a UCITS are referred to in the English text of the UCITS Directive as
"units." UCITS Directive at 4 (cited in note 17). Since the term "unit" is intended to cover all forms
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UCITS is subject to host Member State control in areas not governed directly
by the UCITS Directive, such as marketing. In particular, the Directive
permits a UCITS to advertise its units for sale in a host Member State only if
the UCITS complies with laws governing advertising in the host Member
State. 76 The rationale underlying the host Member State's control of UCITS
marketing is that it has the strongest interest in regulating the marketing
practices of the UCITS and is in the best position to regulate marketing
77
activities within its borders.
To achieve a basic, harmonized set of investor protection rules, the UCITS
Directive establishes a variety of risk-reducing requirements which must be
satisfied to qualify any collective investment vehicle as a UCITS. 78 These
criteria include limitations on the types of permissible investments for the
UCITS, 79 requirements relating to the diversification of investments and
limitations on the size of investment in any single venture. 80
To ensure that the Directive's diversification requirements are not
indirectly circumvented and that no duplication of costs or management fees
occurs, the Directive prohibits the investment of a UCITS assets in open-end
of securities that could be issued by a UCITS, depending on the legal status of a UCITS, units may
take a variety of forms, including shares or beneficial interests.
76. See id at arts 44-48.
77. See Proposal for a Council Directive for the coordination of laws, regulations, and
administrative provisions regarding collective investment undertaking for transferable securities
COM(76)152 final at 10 (April 14, 1976). An additional reason why the UCITS Directive does not
include marketing restrictions was the belief that an attempt to coordinate marketing measures in the
Member States would have significantly delayed implementation of the Directive. Furthermore,
because marketing regulations affect all forms of securities, it was felt that coordination of marketing
should be resolved in a more comprehensive manner in a separate directive. Id at 11.
78. The general requirements for categorization as a UCITS are (1) the vehicle must invest in
transferable securities that satisfy certain liquidity requirements (that is, they must be "permissible
investments"); (2) the vehicle must invest its assets in accordance with certain risk-spreading
requirements; and (3) the units issued by the vehicle must, at the request of unitholders, be
repurchased or redeemed, directly or indirectly, out of the assets of the vehicle. UCITS Directive at
art 1(2) (cited in note 17).
79. UCITS investments are generally limited to transferable securities listed on a recognized
stock exchange or another regulated market which "operates regularly and is ... open to the public."
Id at art 19(1). However, the Commission is currently drafting proposals, due out by the end of
1992, which would extend the scope of the directive to include money market funds and funds which
invest in other UCITS. Another proposal would extend the directive to real estate funds. See EC
Officials Considering Expansion of UCITS Directive, 3 EuroWatch 4 (May 8, 1992).
80. In general, a UCITS may not invest more than five percent of its assets in transferable
securities issued by the same entity. Member States may raise the five percent limit to a maximum of
10% (with limited exceptions) so long as the total value of all securities held by a UCITS in issuing
entities in which it has invested more than five percent of its assets does not exceed 40% of the value
of the UCITS. Transferable securities issued and guaranteed by a governmental entity or a public
international body and certain mortgage credit bonds or similar public sector debt securities are not
included for purposes of applying the 40% limit. Member States may raise the general rule's limit to
a maximum of 35% if the transferable securities are issued or guaranteed by a Member State or its
local authority, by a non-Member State or by public international bodies, of which one or more
Member States are members. Member States may also permit UCITS to invest up to 100% of their
assets in such securities so long as (1) the UCITS holds securities from at least six different issues, (2)
the securities of any one issue do not account for more than 30% of the UCITS's total assets, and (3)
the UCITS complies with certain disclosure and approval requirements relating to information about
issuers in whose securities the UCITS intends to invest more than 35% of its assets. See UCITS
Directive arts 22-23 (cited in note 17).
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mutual funds that do not qualify as UCITS and also prohibits investment of
more than five percent of a UCITS' assets in units of other UCITS. 8 '
To prevent conflicts of interest, the Directive generally prohibits
investment of a UCITS' assets in units of another UCITS under common
management or control with it.82 Similarly, the Directive prohibits investment
in the transferable securities of an issuer in amounts sufficient to permit the
UCITS to exercise "significant influence" over the management of the
83
issuer.
In addition to imposing risk-reducing requirements, 8 4 the UCITS
Directive seeks to protect unsophisticated investors by establishing basic
requirements for the management of UCITS' assets. For example, the UCITS
Directive generally requires that the assets of a UCITS be entrusted to a
depositary for safekeeping. 5 The depositary must either maintain its
86
registered office in, or be established in, the UCITS' home Member State.
In addition, the depositary must be "subject to public control"-that is, to
regulation by the competent authorities in the UCITS' home Member Stateand have sufficient financial resources both to pursue its business as a
depositary and to meet its commitments.
Finally, the UCITS Directive requires each corporate UCITS and each
management company of a non-corporate UCITS to publish a prospectus, an
annual report, and a half-yearly report. The Directive also establishes
detailed disclosure requirements for UCITS prospectuses and periodic
reports. As a general matter, sufficient information must be provided to
investors to enable them to make an "informed judgment" regarding the
87
UCITS.
B.

The Listing Particulars and Prospectus Directives

Two of the most significant Commission directives in the capital markets
area are the Listing Particulars Directive88 and the Prospectus Directive. 89
These directives are intended to facilitate the development of an integrated
capital market in the European Community by establishing the principle of
81. Id at art 24. See also note 79.
82. UCITS Directive at art 24(3)-(4) (cited in note 17). But see note 79.
83. Member States may waive this limitation with respect to securities issued by Member States,
non-Member States, or public international bodies. Id at art 25(3).
84. See note 77 and accompanying text.
85. UCITS Directive at arts 7(1), 14(l) (cited in note 17). The UCITS Directive provides for two
exceptions to this requirement with respect to certain corporate UCITS that market their units
through stock exchanges on which they are listed. See id at arts 14(4), 14(5).
86. Id at arts 8(1), 15(1). The home Member State ofa UCITS is the Member State in which it is
"situated." A UCITS is deemed to be situated in the Member State in which its registered office (or,
in the case of an unincorporated UCITS, the registered office of its management company) is
located. Id at art 3.
87. Id at art 28.
88. See note 18 for complete citation.
89. Council Directive 89/298, 1989 OJ (L 124/8) (requirements for prospectus when
transferable securities are offered to the public) ("Prospectus Directive").
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securities

disclosure

1. Listing ParticularsDirective. A prerequisite to the listing of securities on
European stock exchanges is publication of a disclosure document, or "listing
particulars," relating to the offered securities. The need to satisfy different
disclosure requirements of stock exchanges in the various Member States has
been a significant barrier to the multiple listing of securities in the
Community. 90 The Council took its first step toward eliminating this barrier
in 1979 with the adoption of the Admissions Directive, 9 1 which established a
set of minimum criteria that an issuer must satisfy before a security can be
92
listed on an official stock exchange of a Member State.
The Listing Particulars Directive was proposed shortly thereafter and was
intended to further the harmonization process begun by the Admissions
Directive. The Directive provides that, subject to specified exceptions,9 3 stock
exchanges must require the publication of listing particulars as a prerequisite
to listing. The Listing Particulars Directive established a minimum disclosure
standard, setting out the form and content of the information that an issuer
must disclose prior to listing. 94 In addition, as originally enacted the
Directive called for Member States to "use their best endeavors to achieve
maximum coordination of their requirements concerning listing particulars"
to facilitate simultaneous applications to several stock exchanges. 9 5 The
90. A recent empirical study based on data on 481 companies from 10 countries concludes that
"reporting requirements constitute a major influence on firms' choices among alternative stock
exchanges" in the world and that "firms appear more likely to list where the disclosure requirements
are similar to . . . [those of] their own countries." Shahrokh M. Saudagaran, An Investigation of Selected
Factors Influencing Aultiple Listing and the Choice of ForeignStock Exchanges, in Raj Aggarwal & Cheng-Few
Lee, eds, 4B Advances in Financial Planning and Forecasting 75, 117 (JAI Press, 1990). In a context
closely related to the multiple listing of securities, the International Organization of Securities
Commissions ("IOSCO") notes in its comparative review of disclosure requirements in 14 countries
that "the differences in financial reporting probably present one of the greatest challenges for issuers
seeking to make multinational offerings of securities." IOSCO, Comparative Analysis of Disclosure
Regimes 4 (IOSCO, 1991).
91. Council Directive 79/279, 1979 OJ (L 66/21) (admission of securities to stock exchange
listing) ("Admissions Directive"), as supplemented by Council Directive 82/148, 1982 OJ (L 62).
92. These criteria include a foreseeable market capitalization (of the shares for which admission
to official listing is sought) of at least one million ECU and disclosure of financial accounts for the
previous three years. Id at Annex Schedule A.
93. Article 1(2) of the Directive provides that the Directive shall not apply to UCITS or to
"securities issued by a state or by its regional or local authorities." Listing Particulars Directive at 2
(cited in note 18).
94. The Directive provides detailed minimum disclosure requirements with respect to both
financial and non-financial information. Id at Annex Schedules A, B, and C. In addition, subject to
the right of the competent authorities in the issuer's home Member State to provide exemptions
from the disclosure requirements in certain cases, the Directive requires that listing particulars
contain the information necessary "to enable investors and their investment advisors to make an
informed assessment of the assets and liabilities, financial position, profits and losses, and prospects
of the issuer and of the rights attaching to such securities." Id at art 4(1). Article 6 allows the
competent authorities in the issuer's home Member State to exempt a variety of securities, including:
(1) securities publicly issued in connection with a takeover offer providing that listing particulars had
been published in the previous year; (2) securities issued as part of a rights offering or as part of a
conversion or exchange; or (3) securities issued by a state-sanctioned monopoly or state enterprise.
95. Id at art 24(1).

Page 7: Autumn 19921

EC

FINANCIAL SERVICES

Directive permitted Member States to maintain higher standards than those
required by the Directive, however, limiting its impact. 9 6
The Listing Particulars Directive was substantially revised in 1987 to
account for the change in the Commission's focus from harmonization of
Community law to the principle of mutual recognition. 9 7 The revised Listing
Particulars Directive incorporates that principle, essentially by providing that
when applications for admission to official listing in two or more Member
States are made simultaneously or within a "short interval," 98 listing
particulars that satisfy the minimum disclosure requirements of the Listing
Particulars Directive and are approved by the appropriate authority in the
issuer's home Member State 99 must be recognized by stock exchanges in any
other Member State in which listing has been applied for. 10 0 To serve as
listing particulars for the purposes of the Listing Particulars Directive, a
prospectus may conform to either the Prospectus Directive or the Listing
Particulars Directive.' 0 '
The mutual recognition regime has significantly reduced Member State
barriers to multiple cross-border listings. Host Member State control
continues to have an impact in two areas, however. First, Member States may
require that listing particulars contain additional information that is specific to
the market of the country of admission to listing. Specifically, this
information may include local income taxation, the financial organizations
retained to act as paying agents for the issuer in that country, and publication
of notices to investors. 0 2 Second, and more importantly, while the Directive
requires mutual recognition of listing particulars, it does not require that a
specific stock exchange agree to list any specific securities. Competent
authorities may still refuse to list a specific security under the Admissions
Directive if they deem that "the issuer's situation is such that admission would
be detrimental to investor['s] interest."' 0 3
96. See David M. Barnard, The Effect of 1992 on the Euromarkets, 630 PLI 603, 635-36 (1989).
97. See June 22 Directive (cited in note 18). The Listing Particulars Directive had been
amended previously on March 3, 1982 by Council Directive 82/148, 1982 OJ (L 62). That
amendment extended the implementation date of the Listing Particulars Directive (cited in note 18),
the Admissions Directive (cited in note 91), and Council Directive 82/121, 1982 OJ (L 48)
(publication of information by listed companies) to June 30, 1983 in order to allow Member States to
implement all three Directives simultaneously.
98. Although the June 22 Directive itself does not define a "short interval," it mandates
recognition by other Member States of prospectuses approved in accordance with the Listing
Particulars Directive within the previous three months. June 22 Directive at art 24b(l) (cited in note
18).
99. An issuer's home Member State is the Member State in which the issuer has its registered
office. If an issuer's registered office is located outside the Community, the issuer must choose a
Member State to serve as its home Member State. Id at art 24.
100. Id at art 24b(l).
101. Article 2(1) of the April 23 Directive (cited in note 18) provides that a prospectus that meets
the disclosure requirements of the Listing Particulars Directive and is drawn up and approved in
accordance with the Prospectus Directive within the three months preceding an application for
admission to official listing shall be accepted as listing particulars.
102. SeeJune 22 Directive at art 24(a)(1) (cited in note 18).
103. See Admissions Directive at art 9(3) (cited in note 91).
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2. Prospectus Directive. The Prospectus Directive is designed principally to
extend the disclosure and, to a lesser extent, the mutual recognition
requirements of the Listing Particulars Directive to unlisted securities.
Although a Prospectus Directive establishing minimum disclosure standards
to govern the sale of unlisted securities had been debated since 198 1,1 04 it was
not until 1989 that the Directive was finally adopted.
The Prospectus Directive mandates that a prospectus be published
whenever "transferable securities" 0 5 are "offered to the public" 0 6 for the
first time in a Member State, if the securities are not already listed on a stock
exchange in that Member State. Excluded from the scope of the Directive are
a variety of securities, most notably transferable securities that can be
acquired for consideration of 40,000 ECU or more. The Prospectus Directive
also does not apply to "euro-securities"' 1 7 that are not the subject of a
generalized campaign of advertising or canvassing. The purpose of these
exceptions is to allow the Prospectus Directive to provide minimum,
harmonized disclosure rules to protect the average investor, without
subjecting those types of securities that are traded only by large institutional
investors to additional, potentially burdensome, regulation. 10 8
If transferable securities are to be listed, the disclosure requirements of
the Prospectus Directive may be satisfied by listing particulars prepared in
accordance with the Listing Particulars Directive, "subject to adaptations
appropriate to the circumstances of a public offer."' 0 9 Unlisted securities are
governed by the disclosure requirements of article 11 of the Prospective
Directive, which are similar to, but less detailed than, those of the Listing
Particulars Directive. Alternatively, article 12 enables Member States to allow
the issuer of unlisted securities to prepare instead a prospectus in accordance
with the Listing Particulars Directive.
The Prospectus Directive incorporates the principle of mutual recognition
by providing that a prospectus prepared in accordance with both its
requirements and those of the Listing Particulars Directive, and approved by
the appropriate authority,'10 can be used in all Member States in which the
related securities will be offered simultaneously or within a short interval of
104. The Commission transmitted a proposed Prospectus Directive to the Council on January 13,
1981. On April 23, 1982, the European Parliament endorsed the proposed Prospectus Directive and
recommended certain changes to the version proposed to the Council. The Council endorsed an
amended proposal for a Prospectus Directive on July 19, 1982, but final adoption was delayed.
105. Transferable securities include equity securities, debt securities with maturities of greater
than one year, and any other securities that provide the holder with the right to acquire equity or
debt by subscription or exchange. Prospectus Directive at art 3(e) (cited in note 89).
106. The Member States were unable to agree on a common definition of "offer to the public."
Id at art 8. See Barnard, 630 PLI at 636-37 (cited in note 96).
107. Euro-securities, as defined by the Prospectus Directive, are securities that are (1)
underwritten and distributed by a syndicate composed of firms from more than one Member State;
(2) offered on a significant scale in more than one Member State; and (3) subscribed for or initially
acquired only through a financial institution. Prospectus Directive at art 3(f) (cited in note 89).
108. Barnard, 630 PLI at 638 (cited in note 96).
109. Prospectus Directive at arts 7, 8(1) (cited in note 89).
110. Normally, the appropriate authority for approval of an issuer's prospectus is the authority in
the Member State in which the issuer has its registered office. See id at art 20.
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one another." I Prospectuses offering unlisted securities need not provide all
of the information required by the Listing Particulars Directive, but such
prospectuses will not benefit from the mutual recognition provisions of the
Prospectus Directive.
IV
CONCLUSION
BALANCING

REGULATORY OBJECTIVES WITHIN A MUTUAL RECOGNITION

FRAMEWORK

The choice of a regulatory framework for financial services depends on the
particular policy goals sought to be achieved. No single framework is optimal
to promote the often-conflicting policy goals vying in the financial services
sector. Concerns regarding consumer and counterparty protection, safety
and soundness, and systemic risk must be balanced against the risk of
reducing beneficial competition among international financial service
intermediaries through overly restrictive legislation.
A number of different supranational forums in recent years have
attempted to decide which principles of international trade best accommodate
the regulatory needs of the financial services sector.' 1 2 The United States
generally invokes the principle of nondiscrimination or "national treatment"
in the financial services sector." 1 3 Under this approach, a host country seeks
to provide "equality of competitive opportunity" with respect to the rights
and obligations of domestic and foreign firms within its regulatory
structure. ' 14
Because of the basic freedoms protected by the Treaty of Rome,
Community regulatory initiatives in the financial services sector begin with the
premise that Member States should not discriminate against financial service
providers from other Member States. The principle of mutual recognition
adopted by the Community goes beyond a national treatment approach by
111. As with the Listing Particulars Directive, host Member State control continues to have an
impact under the Prospectus Directive which allows Member States to require that the prospectus
contain additional information specific to the market of the country in which the public offer is made
(for example, information regarding the income tax system, the financial organizations retained to
act as paying agents for the issuer in that Member State, and publication of notices to investors). Id
at art 21(l).

112.

Discussions of which international trade principles should govern the financial services

sector have occurred during the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations at the

Uruguay Round and within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. See
SydneyJ. Key & Hal S. Scott, InternationalTrade in Banking Services: A Conceptual Framework, Occasional
Papers 35, at I (Group of Thirty, 1991).
113. See Dept of Treasury, National Treatment Study: Report to Congress on Foreign Govt Treatment of
U.S. Commercial Banking and Securities Organizations-1986Update 1 (1986), cited in Michael J. Levitin,
The Treatment of United States FinancialServices Firms in Post-1992 Europe, 31 Harv Intl LJ 507, 518
(1990).
114. Id. The OECD has defined the principle of national treatment somewhat differently:
"[T]reatment under host country laws, regulations and administrative practices ... no less favorable
than that accorded in like situations to domestic enterprises." See Key & Scott, Occasional Papers 35
at 8 (cited in note 112).
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effectively disadvantaging domestic service providers vis-A-vis competitors
from Member States with less restrictive regulation, thereby imposing
pressures to converge on a regulatory standard. In a similar vein, the
Community's posture with respect to third countries has been to advocate
greater host country regulatory liberalization than would result simply from
the application of a national treatment approach. Community calls for
"reciprocity" in financial services, however, have been taken as threatened
protectionism.' 15
These various approaches to international trade in financial services have
been analyzed for policy impact in terms of the types of rules on which they
primarily rely, whether host country rules, home country rules, or harmonized
rules, and the method of providing services-across borders, through
branches, and via subsidiaries."16 For example, the goal of promoting
competition is generally best served by home country rules, and thus home
country control. The safety and soundness of international financial
institutions, on the other hand, are typically best protected by harmonized
prudential standards. Finally, certain consumer protection goals are
optimally achieved by the imposition of host country rules, such as particular
7
types of disclosure requirements.1
In general, the European Community's mutual recognition approach to
liberalizing intra-Community trade in financial services should serve to allay
the financial sector policy concerns of both home and host Member States.
Home country authorization and supervision will lead to increased
competition among financial intermediaries in the Community. Ancillary host
Member State control will provide necessary consumer and other protections.
Harmonized minimum prudential standards will alleviate a number of
concerns regarding safety and soundness and systemic risk.
Some aspects of the current Community approach to financial services
regulation, however, continue to require further examination and, in some
cases, new initiatives. For example, the Council of Ministers has recognized
that changes are needed with respect to the consolidated supervision of credit
institutions, by adopting a new Consolidated Supervision Directive' 1 8 to
clarify which Member State bears the responsibility for leading the
supervisory effort. Changes are also warranted to provide clear rights and
obligations among supervisors to information necessary for adequate
monitoring of solvency and risk.' 9 The new Consolidated Supervision
115. In a speech before the Institute of International Economics, Deputy Secretary of the
Treasury M. Peter McPherson cautioned that "reciprocity that seeks identical treatment in different
countries is a retreat back to protectionism" and that "legitimate differences in national regulatory
regimes could be used to justify discrimination against foreign firms." Remarks by M. Peter
McPherson, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, to the Institute for International Economics (Aug 4,
1988), excerpted in Levitin, 31 Harv Intl LJ at 522 (cited in note 113).
116. Key & Scott, Occasional Papers 35 at 3 (cited in note 112).
117. Idat 5-6.
118. Consolidated Supervision Directive, Council Directive 92/30, 1992 OJ (L 10/52) (repealing
Council Directive 83/350, 1983 OJ (L193/18)) ("Consolidated Supervision Directive").
119. See Leon Brittan, Lessons of BCCIfor the Regulators, Fin Times 11 (July 29, 1991).
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Directive would also vest in the Commission authority to negotiate third
country agreements regarding consolidated supervision and information20
sharing arrangements. 1
The Commission is also preparing a directive to impose minimum
standards of deposit protection throughout the Community.121 The planned
directive would place responsibility for deposit protection on a credit
institution's home Member State regulator to reinforce that Member State's
primary responsibility for prudential supervision. 22 The planned Directive
would seek to protect individual depositors without promoting undue risktaking by depositors or credit institutions covered by deposit protection
arrangements.

23

Areas of concern remain, however. For example, host Member States lack
clear authority under the Second Banking and Investment Services Directives
to intervene if the home Member State regulator fails to police adequately the
prudential standards for which it is responsible. Moreover, limited financial
responsibility for deposit protection may not sufficiently deter lax
enforcement.
Finally, serious questions must be addressed regarding competing claims
from different Member States on the failure of a Community credit institution
or investment firm. Far too little real progress has been made in agreeing
upon the appropriate approach to the problem of reconciling different
Member States methods of dealing with claims in a winding up, liquidation, or
bankruptcy. 124
The outstanding issues in this area are difficult yet capable of resolution
without compromising the mutual recognition principle. As a result, the
European Community is poised to gain considerable benefits from
competition among its financial service providers and, indirectly, its systems
of financial service regulation.
12 5

APPENDIX

LIST OF ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO MUTUAL RECOGNITION

1. Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public.
2. Lending (including consumer credit, mortgage credit, factoring and
financing of commercial transactions).
3. Financial leasing.
4. Money transmission services.
120. Consolidated Supervision Directive at art 8 (cited in note 118).
121. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive, COM(88)4 final, (January 4, 1988)
(reorganization, winding up, and deposit guarantee schemes) ("Winding-up Directive").
122. Id. See also Roy Goode, 1992: The Insolveny Implicationsfor Banks, in Cranston, Single Market
at 146 (cited in note 3).
123. See generally Winding-up Directive (cited in note 121). See also Brittan, Fin Times 11
(cited in note 119).
124. See generally Single Market at 146-48 (cited in note 3).
125. See Annex to the Second Banking Directive (cited in note 15).
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5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
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Issuing and administering means of payment (such as credit cards,
travellers' cheques, and bankers' drafts).
Guarantees and commitments.
Trading for own account or for account of customers in (a) money
market instruments; (b) foreign exchange; (c) financial futures and
options; (d) exchange and interest rate instruments; and (e) transferable
securities.
Participation in share issues and the provision of services related to such
issues.
Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and
related questions and advice, and services relating to mergers and the
purchase of undertakings.
Money broking.
Portfolio management and advice.
Safekeeping and administration of securities.
Credit reference services.
Safe custody services.

